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1.	  	   Introduction	  	  Epistemic	   Contextualism	   is	   the	   view	   that	   “knows	   that”	   is	   semantically	   context-­‐‑sensitive	   and	   that	  properly	   accommodating	   this	   fact	   into	   our	   philosophical	   theory	   promises	   to	   solve	   various	   puzzles	  concerning	  knowledge.1	  Yet	  Epistemic	  Contextualism	  faces	  a	  big—some	  would	  say	  fatal—problem:	  The	  
Semantic	  Error	  Problem.2	   In	  its	  prominent	  form,	  this	  runs	  thus:	  speakers	  just	  don’t	  seem	  to	  recognise	  that	  “knows	  that”	  is	  context-­‐‑sensitive;	  so,	  if	  “knows	  that”	  really	  is	  context-­‐‑sensitive	  then	  such	  speakers	  are	  systematically	  in	  error	  about	  what	  is	  said	  by,	  or	  how	  to	  evaluate,	  ordinary	  uses	  of	  “S	  knows	  that	  p”;	  but	   since	   it's	   wildly	   implausible	   that	   ordinary	   speakers	   should	   exhibit	   such	   systematic	   error,	   the	  expression	  “knows	  that”	  isn't	  context-­‐‑sensitive.3	  We	  are	  interested	  in	  whether,	  and	  in	  what	  ways,	  there	  is	  such	  semantic	  error;	  if	  there	  is	  such	  error,	   how	   it	   arises	   and	   is	   made	   manifest;	   and,	   again,	   if	   there	   is	   such	   error	   to	   what	   extent	   it	   is	   a	  problem	  for	  Epistemic	  Contextualism.	  The	  upshot	   is	   that	  some	  forms	  of	  The	  Semantic	  Error	  Problem	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  largely	  unproblematic.	  Those	  that	  remain	  troublesome	  have	  analogue	  error	  problems	  for	  various	   competitor	   conceptions	   of	   knowledge.	   So,	   if	   error	   is	   any	   sort	   of	   problem,	   then	   there	   is	   a	  problem	  for	  every	  extant	  competitor	  view.	  	  	  
2.	   Epistemic	  Contextualism	  	  Broadly	  conceived,	  Epistemic	  Contextualism	  (hereafter:	  Contextualism)	  is	  the	  view	  that	  the	  truth-­‐‑value	  of	  “S	  knows	  that	  p”	   is	  sensitive	  to	  the	  epistemic	  standards	  which	  obtain	   in	  the	  context	  of	  use.4	  These	  standards	  fix	  how	  strong	  the	  epistemic	  position	  of	  the	  subject	  S	  needs	  to	  be	  in	  order	  for	  this	  sentence	  to	  be	  true.	  So,	  in	  some	  context,	  a	  speaker	  may	  truly	  utter	  “S	  knows	  that	  p”,	  while	  in	  a	  different	  context,	  a	  speaker	  may	  truly	  utter	  “S	  does	  not	  know	  that	  p”,	  even	  though	  these	  contexts	  merely	  differ	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  epistemic	  standards—and	  so	  remain	  the	  same	  in	  respect	  of	  epistemic	  position.	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Specific	  forms	  of	  Contextualism	  differ	  as	  to	  what	  this	  sameness	  of	  epistemic	  position	  amounts	  to.	   For	   convenience,	   we	   assume	   it	   amounts	   to	   the	   sameness	   of	   the	   evidence	   of	   the	   subject	   S.5	  Furthermore,	   there	   are	   various	   accounts	   as	   to	   what	   raises	   or	   lowers	   the	   epistemic	   standards.	   For	  simplicity,	  we	   assume	   the	   standards	   are	   fixed	   by	  which	   error	   possibilities	   are	   salient	   (ignoring,	   e.g.,	  practical	   stakes).	   We	   shall	   also	   assume	   that	   there	   are	   just	   two	   contexts:	   high	   standards	   contexts,	  (hereafter:	  HIGH),	  where	   even	   far-­‐‑fetched	   error	   possibilities	   are	   salient;	   and	   low-­‐‑standards	   contexts,	  (hereafter:	   LOW),	   where	   such	   error	   possibilities	   are	   not	   salient.	   Any	   differences	   between	   this	  simplified	   version	   and	   specific	   contemporary	   forms	   of	   Contextualism	   shouldn’t	   matter	   to	   our	  discussion.	  	  	  	  
3.	  	   Modest	  versus	  Ambitious	  Contextualism	  	  	  
Modest	   Contextualism	   merely	   gives	   a	   theory	   of	   the	   meaning	   and	   use	   of	   “S	   knows	   that	   p”	   and	   thus	  involves:	  accounting	  for	  the	  intuitive	  judgements	  concerning	  the	  truth,	  or	  assertibility,	  of	  this	  sentence;	  making	  sense	  of	   (dis)agreement	   involving	  such	  sentences;	  and	  specifying	  the	  norms	  of	  assertion	  and	  retraction	   for	   such	   sentences.	  Ambitious	  Contextualism,	  meanwhile,	   deploys	   the	   insights	   gained	   from	  Modest	   Contextualism	   to	   resolve	   a	   range	   of	   puzzles	   concerning	   knowledge,	   such	   as	   Cartesian	  Scepticism,	  lottery	  scepticism,	  the	  dogmatism	  paradox,	  the	  puzzle	  of	  easy	  knowledge,	  and	  so	  on.	  As	  we	  shall	  see,	  semantic	  error	  problems	  have	  been	  leveled	  against	  both	  kinds	  of	  Contextualist	  project.6	  	  	  
4.	  	   Kinds	  of	  Semantic	  Error:	  Preliminary	  Distinctions	  	  Broadly,	   semantic	   error	   is	   some	  kind	  of	  mistake,	  made	  by	  a	   speaker,	  with	   respect	   to	   some	   semantic	  property	  of	  a	  word	  or	  string	  of	  words.	  A	  prototypical	  case	  is	  where	  a	  speaker	  is	  mistaken	  about	  what	  a	  word	  means.	  Such	  a	  mistake,	  we	  assume,	  typically	  comes	  with	  some	  false,	  usually	  implicit,	  belief,	  and	  typically	   manifests	   itself	   by	   some	   mistaken	   (potential)	   use	   of	   the	   word.	   Semantic	   error	   can	   be	   a	  mistake	   about	   a	   semantic	   feature	   that	   is	   in	   principle	   accessible	   to	   ordinary	   speakers	   or	   about	   an	  elusive	   semantic	   feature	  which	   only	   a	   theorist	   of	   language	  may	   be	   privy	   to.	   To	   isolate	   the	   relevant	  kinds	  of	  error	  we	  are	  interested	  in,	  it	  will	  help	  to	  sketch	  some	  preliminary	  distinctions:	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(1)  Semantic	  Error	  versus	  Semantic	  Ignorance:	  Semantic	  error	  involves	  more	  than	  mere	  ignorance;	  it	   typically	   involves	   some	   false	   (implicit)	   belief	   about	   some	   semantic	   property	   of	   an	  expression.7	  Such	  a	  false	  (implicit)	  belief	  will	  typically	  be	  made	  manifest	  by	  some	  misuse	  of	  the	  expression	  in	  question.	  (2)  Global	  versus	  Local	  Semantic	  Error:	  A	  speaker	  makes	  a	  local	  semantic	  error	  if	  she	  uses	  the	  word	  in	  ways	  incompatible	  with	  the	  semantic	  theory	  only	  in	  specific	  kinds	  of	  use	  situation	  (such	  as	  the	  sceptical	  argument);	  a	  speaker	  makes	  a	  global	  semantic	  error	  if	  she	  uses	  the	  word	  in	  ways	  incompatible	  with	  the	  semantic	  theory	  in	  all	  kinds	  of	  use	  situations.	  (3)  Universal	   versus	   Individual	   Semantic	   Error:	   Semantic	   error	   is	   universal	   (with	   respect	   to	   a	  language	  community)	  if	  all	  (or	  nearly	  all)	  competent	  speakers	  of	  that	  language	  community	  are	  in	   error.	   It	   is	   individual	   (with	   respect	   to	   a	   language	   community)	   if	   it	   occurs	   only	   in	   a	   single	  competent	  speaker	  of	  the	  language.	  (4)  Systematic	  vs	  Non-­‐‑Systematic	  Semantic	  Error:	  Given	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  use	  situation	  (e.g.	   the	  sceptical	  argument),	  a	  speaker	  who	  always	  uses	  the	  expression	  in	  a	  particular,	  erroneous	  way	  is	  systematically	  semantically	  in	  error.	  One	  who	  does	  so	  only	  in	  some	  instantiations	  of	  a	  given	  kind	  of	  use	  situation	  is	  non-­‐‑systematically	  in	  error.8	  	  As	  we	   shall	   see,	   Contextualism	   is	   allegedly	   committed	   to	   positing	   a	   kind	   of	   semantic	   error	  which	   is	  systematic,	  universal,	  and	  multiply	  local.	  	  	  
5.	  	   Ambitious	  Contextualism	  and	  Cartesian	  Scepticism	  	  Ambitious	  Contextualism,	  as	  mentioned	  above	  seeks	  to	  resolve	  various	  epistemological	  puzzles.	  With	  respect	  to	  Cartesian	  Scepticism,	  it	  typically	  proceeds	  as	  follows:	  	  (i)	  The	  basic	  form	  of	  the	  (Cartesian)	  Sceptical	  Argument	  (SA)	  is	  this:	  	   Premise	  A:	  	   	   I	  don’t	  know	  that	  not-­‐‑SH.	  Premise	  B:	  	   	   If	  I	  don’t	  know	  that	  not-­‐‑SH	  then	  I	  don’t	  know	  that	  O.	  Conclusion	  C:	  	   	   I	  don’t	  know	  that	  O.9	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Here	  O	  stands	  for	  some	  ordinary	  claim	  (e.g.	  I	  am	  in	  London),	  and	  SH	  for	  some	  sceptical	  hypothesis	  (e.g.	  
I	  am	  a	  brain	  in	  a	  vat	  being	  “fed”	  non-­‐‑veridical	  experiences	  of	  the	  external	  world).	  	  (ii)	  SA	  represents	  a	  paradox:	  the	  premises	  A	  and	  B	  are	  (initially)	  highly	  plausible;	  the	  conclusion	  C	  is	  (initially)	  highly	  implausible;	  yet,	  the	  reasoning	  from	  A	  and	  B	  to	  C	  is	  (taken	  to	  be)	  valid.	  	  Standardly,	   to	   resolve	  a	  paradox	  one	  must	  discharge	   two	  explanatory	   tasks:	   (1)	  Establish	  some	   fault	  with	   the	  reasoning,	  premises,	  or	  presuppositions	  of	   the	  argument,	  or	  establish	   that	   the	  conclusion	   is	  not	   so	   toxic	  after	  all.	   (2)	  Explain	   just	  why	  we,	  epistemologists	  and	   the	   folk	  alike,	  mistakenly	   thought	  that	  some	  premise,	   rule	  of	   inference,	  or	  presupposition	  was	   true/valid,	  or	  explain	  why,	  contra	   initial	  appearances,	  the	  conclusion	  is	  not	  so	  toxic	  after	  all.	  To	  discharge	  the	  first	  explanatory	  task,	  Ambitious	  Contextualism	  proceeds	  thus:	  	  (iii)	  Premise	  A	  introduces	  a	  sceptical	  hypothesis	  thus	  raising	  the	  standards	  to	  HIGH.	  A	  is	  true	  in	  HIGH	  because	  my	  epistemic	  position	  is	  too	  weak	  to	  meet	  the	  standards	  for	  "I	  know	  that	  not-­‐‑SH"	  to	  be	  true.10	  	  (iv)	  Premise	  B	  is	  true	  as	  used	  in	  both	  LOW	  and	  HIGH.11	  	  (v)	  So,	  for	  Ambitious	  Contextualism,	  SA	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  a	  sound	  argument	  at	  least	  in	  HIGH:	  the	  premises	  A	   and	  B,	   used	   in	  HIGH,	   are	  both	   true,	   the	   reasoning	   is	  deductively	   valid,	   and	   so	   the	   conclusion	  C,	   as	  derived	  in	  HIGH,	  is	  true	  too.	  	  	  (vi)	   In	   contrast,	   the	   conclusion	   C	   is	   false	   when	   used	   in	   LOW.	   That’s	   because	   when	   sceptical	   error	  possibilities	  are	  not	  salient,	  my	  epistemic	  position	  is	  strong	  enough	  to	  meet	  the	  epistemic	  standards.	  	  	  (vii)	  For	  Ambitious	  Contextualism,	   the	  upshot	  of	   (v)	  and	  (vi)	   is	   that	  although	   the	  sceptical	  argument	  does	  indeed	  show	  that	  knowledge	  ascriptions	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  false	  when	  used	  in	  HIGH,	  it	  falls	  short	  of	  establishing	  that	  ordinary	  knowledge	  ascriptions	  are	  false	  when	  used	  in	  LOW.	  Thus,	  the	  sting	  of	  SA	  has,	  allegedly,	   been	   drawn	   because	   it	   fails	   to	   establish	   tout	   court	   that	   I	   lack	   knowledge	   of	   ordinary	  propositions.12	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6.	  	   Local	  and	  Global	  Semantic	  Error	  	  What	  of	  the	  second	  task?	  This	  amounts	  to	  explaining	  why	  we	  (initially)	  take	  C	  to	  be	  false,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that,	  as	  used	  in	  SA,	  it	  is	  true.	  Contextualism’s	  explanation	  is	  as	  follows:	  	  (viii)	  Despite	  its	  use	  in	  SA,	  we	  mistakenly	  treat	  the	  conclusion	  C	  as	  if	  it	  was	  used	  in	  LOW,	  and	  thus	  we	  treat	  it	  as	  expressing	  the	  false	  proposition	  it	  would	  express	  in	  LOW.	  Furthermore,	  we	  are	  unaware	  of	  our	  assessing,	  when	  considering	  SA,	  this	  false	  proposition	  rather	  than	  the	  true	  proposition	  C	  expresses	  in	  the	  HIGH	  context	  of	  SA.	  This	  explains	  why	  we	  (initially)	  find	  C	  so	  implausible	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  straightforwardly	  follows	  from	  plausible	  premises.13	  So,	   if	   SA	   is	   a	   paradox,	   with	   initially	   plausible	   premises	   and	   a	   (simultaneously)	   implausible	  conclusion,	   then,	   according	   to	   Ambitious	   Contextualism,	   the	   speaker	   of	   SA	   makes	   a	   certain	   Local	  
Semantic	  Error:	  	  	  
Local	   Semantic	   Error:	   The	   speaker	   of	   SA	   mistakenly	   takes	   C,	   when	   derived	   in	   SA,	   as	   saying	  something	  false.	  	  	  In	   a	  much	   discussed	   paper,	   in	  which	   the	   Semantic	   Error	   Problem	   first	   rose	   to	   prominence,	   Schiffer	  (1996)	  offers	  an	  explanation	  of	  the	  source	  of	  this	  Local	  Semantic	  Error:	  	  [SA]	   strikes	  us	   as	  presenting	   a	  profound	  paradox	  merely	  because	  we're	   ignorant	  of	  what	   it's	  really	  saying,	  and	  this	  because	  we	  don't	  appreciate	  the	  indexical	  nature	  of	  knowledge	  sentences	  (Schiffer	  1996,	  p.	  325).	  	  Here,	   Schiffer	   has	   a	   specific	   version	   of	   Contextualism	   in	   mind,	   namely,	   Indexical	   Contextualism,	  according	  to	  which	  utterances	  of	  “S	  knows	  that	  p”	  can	  express	  different	  propositions	  in	  contexts	  where	  the	  epistemic	  standards	  differ	  (see	  below).	  	  With	  the	  help	  of	  our	  distinctions	  from	  §4,	  we	  reconstruct	  Schiffer’s	  reasoning	  as	  follows:	  Firstly,	  we	  have:	  	  
Global	   Indexical	   Ignorance:	   The	   speaker	   of	   “S	   knows	   that	   p”	   is	   ignorant	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   this	  sentence	  can	  say	  different	  things	  in	  different	  contexts	  of	  use	  (which	  merely	  differ	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  epistemic	  standards).	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  Since	  such	  ignorance	  of	  indexicality	  will,	  plausibly,	  lead	  the	  speaker	  to	  treat	  "S	  knows	  that	  p"	  as	  having	  an	  invariant	  content	  (across	  contexts	  which	  merely	  differ	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  epistemic	  standards),	  we	  then	  have:	  	  
Global	   Indexical	   Error:	   The	   speaker	  mistakenly	   takes	   “S	   knows	   that	  p”	   to	   say	   the	   same	   thing	  across	  these	  contexts.	  	  	  Furthermore,	   if	   we	   assume,	   for	   the	   time	   being,	   that	   the	   relevant	   context-­‐‑sensitivity	   is	   exhausted	   by	  indexicality,	  then	  we	  can	  derive	  the	  more	  generic	  error	  claim:	  	  
Global	   Context-­‐‑Sensitivity	   Error:	   The	   speaker	   mistakenly	   takes	   “S	   knows	   that	   p”	   to	   have	   the	  same	  truth-­‐‑value	  across	  contexts	  (which	  merely	  differ	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  epistemic	  standards).	  	  Given	  this,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  speaker	  takes	  “S	  does	  not	  know	  that	  O”,	  as	  used	  in	  ordinary	  contexts,	  to	  be	   false,	   the	   Local	   Semantic	   Error	   immediately	   follows:	   the	   speaker	   mistakenly	   takes	   C,	   when	  used/derived	  in	  SA,	  to	  be	  false.	  	  	  
7.	  	   The	  Semantic	  Error	  Problem	  for	  Ambitious	  Contextualism	  	  Does	   this	   pose	   a	   serious	   problem	   for	   Ambitious	   Contextualism?	   Schiffer	   thinks	   so:	   “while	   this	   error	  theory	   is	   an	   inevitable	   corollary	   of	   the	   semantics	   the	   Contextualist	   needs	   to	   sustain	   her	   solution	   to	  Cartesian	  Scepticism,	  it's	  a	  pretty	  lame	  account	  of	  how,	  according	  to	  her,	  we	  came	  to	  be	  bamboozled	  by	  our	  own	  words”	  (p.	  329).	  Why	  exactly?	  Schiffer	  says:	  	   Since	  a	  knowledge	  sentence	  is	  supposed	  to	  express	  different	  propositions	  in	  different	  contexts	  even	   if	   it	   contains	  no	  apparently	   indexical	   terms,	  one	  naturally	   thinks	  of	  a	   “hidden-­‐‑indexical”	  theory	  of	  knowledge	  sentences	  [...]	  What's	  hard	  to	  see	  is	  how	  the	  hidden-­‐‑indexical	  proposal	  can	  sustain	  the	  idea	  that	  fluent	  speakers	  systematically	  confound	  their	  contexts,	  so	  that	  even	  when	  they're	  in	  a	  context	  in	  which	  [HIGH]	  is	  the	  induced	  standard	  occurring	  in	  the	  false	  proposition	  they	   have	   just	   asserted,	   they	   mistakenly	   think	   they've	   just	   asserted	   a	   true	   proposition,	   a	  proposition	  that	  evidently	  contains	  the	  standard	  [LOW]	  that	  would	  be	  induced	  by	  an	  utterance	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of	  the	  problematic	  sentence	  in	  a	  quite	  different	  context.	  It's	  as	  though	  a	  fluent,	  sane,	  and	  alert	  speaker,	  who	  knows	  where	   she	   is,	  were	   actually	   to	   assert	   the	  proposition	   that	   it's	   raining	   in	  London	  when	  she	  mistakenly	  thinks	  she's	  asserting	  the	  proposition	  that	  it's	  raining	  in	  Oxford.	  Actually,	  the	  situation	  is	  even	  much	  more	  problematic.	  For	  the	  speaker	  would	  not	  only	  have	  to	  be	  confounding	  the	  proposition	  she's	  saying;	  she'd	  also	  have	  to	  be	  totally	  ignorant	  of	  the	  sort	  of	  thing	  she's	  saying	  (Schiffer	  1996,	  p.	  326).	  	  Moreover,	   Schiffer	   thinks	   that	   attribution	   of	   Global	   Indexical	   Ignorance	   and,	   in	   turn,	   Error	   is	  independently	  needed	  by	  the	  Contextualist	  because	  	  	   [...]	  no	  ordinary	  person	  who	  utters	   'I	  know	  that	  p',	  however	  articulate,	  would	  dream	  of	  telling	  you	  that	  what	  he	  meant	  and	  was	  implicitly	  stating	  was	  that	  he	  knew	  that	  p	  relative	  to	  such-­‐‑and-­‐‑such	  standard	  (p.	  326).	  	  And	  so,	  if	  "knows	  that"	  is	  an	  indexical,	  this	  person	  is	  not	  only	  wrong	  about	  what	  particular	  proposition	  is	   being	   expressed,	   but	   ignorant	   of	   the	   very	   kind	   of	   proposition	   being	   expressed.	   That’s	   why	   they	  mistakenly	  take	  “S	  knows	  that	  p”	  to	  express	  the	  same	  proposition	  across	  all	  contexts.14	  Schiffer	   concludes	   that	   the	   kind	   of	   error	   attribution	   needed	   by	   Indexical	   Contextualism	   is	  “extreme”	   and	   “has	   no	   plausibility:	   speakers	   would	   know	   what	   they	   were	   saying	   if	   knowledge	  sentences	  were	   indexical	   in	   the	  way	   the	  Contextualist	   requires”	   (p.	  328).	   In	  effect,	  Schiffer	   is	  making	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  required	  error	  attribution	  is	  highly	  implausible	  because	  the	  kind	  of	  Global	  Indexical	  Ignorance/Error	  he	   thinks	   is	  needed	   to	  explain	   the	  Local	  Semantic	  Error	  would	  represent	  a	  hitherto	  unprecedented	   form	   of	   semantic	   error	   that	   no	   other	   indexical	   words	   exhibit—the	   error	   attribution	  would	  be	  just	  too	  ad	  hoc	  to	  be	  taken	  seriously.	  	  	  
8.	  	   Schiffer’s	  Local	  Semantic	  Error	  Objection	  Regimented	  	  	  A	   regimentation	   of	   Schiffer’s	   Local	   Semantic	   Error	   Objection	   against	   Ambitious	   Contextualism	   thus	  runs:	  	   (1)   The	  Sceptical	  Argument	  SA	  is	  a	  paradox	  with	  plausible	  premises,	  A	  and	  B,	  and	  an	  implausible	  conclusion	  C.	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(2)   Ambitious	  Contextualism	  entails	  that	  SA	  is	  in	  fact	  sound—at	  least	  when	  run	  in	  HIGH.	  (3)   So	  according	   to	  Ambitious	  Contextualism,	   the	  conclusion	  of	  SA	   is	  non-­‐‑toxic	  because	   it	   falls	  short	  of	  establishing	  that	  ordinary	  standards	  for	  knowledge	  are	  not	  met.	  	  (4)   However,	   Ambitious	   Contextualism	   also	   needs	   to	   explain	   why	   we	   were	   drawn	   into	   the	  paradox	   in	   the	   first	   place	   and,	   in	   particular,	   explain	  why	  we	   took	   the	   conclusion	   to	   be	   so	  implausible.	  	  (5)   Contextualism	  can	  do	  this	  only	  if	  it	  posits	  that	  the	  speaker	  of	  SA	  is	  making	  a	  Local	  Semantic	  Error	  whereby	  they	  mistakenly	  take	  C,	  when	  derived	  in	  SA,	  as	  saying	  something	  false.	  (6)   Such	  a	  Local	   Semantic	  Error	   is	  only	   to	  be	  explained	  via	  positing	  a	  kind	  of	  Global	   Indexical	  Error	  whereby	  the	  speaker	  does	  not	  appreciate	  the	  indexical	  nature	  of	  “knows	  that”	  and	  so	  mistakenly	   treats	   C,	   when	   derived	   in	   SA,	   as	   expressing	   the	   same	   proposition	   it	   expresses	  when	  used	  outside	  of	  the	  sceptical	  argument.	  	  (7)   But	  Global	  Indexical	  Error	  represents	  a	  hitherto	  unprecedented	  form	  of	  error	  that	  no	  other	  indexical	  words	  exhibit.	  	  (8)   Hence,	  attribution	  of	  such	  error	  is	  implausible.	  	  (9)   There	  is	  no	  other	  theory	  of	  context-­‐‑sensitivity	  which	  can	  be	  appealed	  to	  which	  can	  explain	  the	  Local	  Semantic	  Error.	  (10)   Thus,	  there	  is	  no	  plausible	  Contextualist	  response	  to	  SA.	  	  How	  should	  Contextualism	  respond?	  	  	  	  
9.	  	   Two	  Initial	  Responses	  
9.1	  	   Response	  One:	  Get	  used	  to	  it!	  	  One	  immediate	  response	  is	  to	  concede	  that	  the	  requisite	  global	  error	  is	  indeed	  unprecedented	  but	  deny	  this	  makes	  the	  required	  error	  attribution	  implausible.	  So,	  reject	  the	  move	  from	  (7)	  to	  (8)	  in	  the	  Local	  Semantic	  Error	  Objection	  above.	  One	  way	  to	  do	  this	  is	  to	  reason	  as	  follows.15	  There	  is	  substantial	  and	  reasonably	  stable	  disagreement	  amongst	  competent	  users	  of	  “knows	  that”	  as	  to	  whether	  premise	  A	  of	  SA	   is	   true.	   If	  moderate	   invariantism	   is	   true	   then	   premise	   A,	   as	   used	   in	   SA,	   is	   false.16	   If	   (scepticism-­‐‑friendly)	  Contextualism	   is	   true	   then	  Premise	  A,	   as	  used	   in	  SA,	   is	   true.	  Either	  way,	   a	   large	  number	  of	  competent	  speakers	  are	  in	  error	  as	  to	  the	  truth-­‐‑value	  of	  premise	  A—at	  least	  as	  used	  in	  SA.	  So,	  either	  way,	  an	  error	  theory	  is	  needed.	  However,	  as	  DeRose	  puts	  it,	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   there	  may	  be	  some	  reason	   for	   thinking	   it's	  more	  problematic	   to	  suppose	   that	  many	  speakers	  are	  blind	  to	  the	  context-­‐‑sensitivity	  of	  their	  own	  words	  than	  to	  suppose	  that	  many	  are	  blind	  to	  the	  context-­‐‑insensitivity	  of	   their	  own	  words.	  But	   it's	  not	  easy	  to	  see	  how	  to	  give	  any	  credible	  argument	  for	  such	  an	  asymmetry	  and	  it's	  perhaps	  best	  not	  to	  stretch	  to	  anticipate	  how	  such	  an	  argument	  might	  go	  (DeRose	  2006,	  p.	  335,	  emphasis	  in	  original).	  	  The	  upshot	   is	   that	  while	  Contextualism	  does	   indeed	   require	  an	  unprecedented	  error	  attribution	   this	  does	   not	   make	   this	   error	   attribution	   implausible	   all	   things	   considered,	   because	   it	   will	   be	   no	   more	  implausible	   than	   the	   unprecedented	   error	   theory	   needed	   by	   competing	   invariantist	   theories	   of	  knowledge.	  This	  response	  is	  plausible	  to	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  its	  pessimism	  is	  warranted.	  Is	  there	  no	  good	  way	   to	   “stretch”	   and	   argue	   for	   the	   superiority	   of	   an	   error	   attribution	   for	   invariantism,	   or	   for	  Contextualism?	  Work	  published	  around	  the	  time	  and	  after	  DeRose’s	  pessimistic	  response	  gives	  reason	  to	  believe	   that	  a	  more	  sophisticated	  weighing	  of	  pros	  and	  cons	   is	  possible,	  once	   the	  views’	  profile	  of	  error	  attributions	  and,	  hence,	  need	  for	  an	  error	  theory,	  comes	  into	  sharper	  relief.17	  	  	  
9.2	  	   Response	  Two:	  Favor	  Modest	  over	  Ambitious	  Contextualism	  	  A	  second	  initial	  response	  concedes	  that	  Schiffer’s	  Local	  Semantic	  Error	  Objection	  is	  effective	  against	  a	  Contextualist	   of	   treatment	  of	   SA,	  but	  maintain	   this	   just	   shows	   that	  Modest	   should	  be	  preferred	  over	  Ambitious	  Contextualism.	  	  	   Firstly,	  such	  a	  response	  robs	  Contextualism	  of	  much	  of	  its	  philosophical	  interest	  since	  it	  is	  not	  equipped	  to	  address	  Cartesian	  Scepticism	  (and	  related	  puzzles).	  Secondly,	  and	  more	  tellingly,	  Modest	  Contextualism	  is	  still	  subject	  to	  a	  Global	  Semantic	  Error	  Objection	  which	  is	  effectively	  embedded	  in	  the	  Local	  Semantic	  Error	  Objection	  given	  above.	  Let’s	  now	  see	  why	  this	  is	  so.	  	  	  	  
10.	  	   Schiffer’s	  Global	  Semantic	  Error	  Objection	  	  It’s	   worth	   distinguishing	   a	   crude	   from	   a	   more	   sophisticated	   form	   of	   the	   Global	   Semantic	   Error	  Objection.	  The	   crude	   form	   runs	   as	   follows:	   indexicality	   should	  be	  obvious;	   since	   "knows	   that"	   is	   not	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obviously	   indexical,	   it’s	   not	   indexical.	   The	   underlying	   idea	   is	   semantic	   transparency:	   if	   speakers,	   in	  their	   linguistic	  behavior,	  are	  unaware	  of	  some	  putative	  feature	  of	  meaning,	  then	  the	  feature	  does	  not	  exist.	  On	   this	   view,	   there	   is	   just	  no	   room	   for	   Indexical	   Semantic	  Error.	  But	   semantic	   transparency	   is	  implausible.	   As	   Schaffer	   &	   Szabo	   (2014,	   534)	   put	   it:	   “Virtually	   every	   sophisticated	   semantic	   theory	  posits	  all	  sorts	  of	  non-­‐‑transparent	  features.	  Non-­‐‑obvious	  context	  sensitivity	  is	  just	  more	  of	  the	  same.”18	  	   The	  more	  sophisticated	  form	  of	  the	  objection,	  encountered	  briefly	  above,	  proceeds	  as	  follows:	  	   (1)  "Knows	  that"	  is	  a	  standard	  kind	  of	  indexical	  (either	  an	  indexical	  verb	  or	  a	  hidden	  indexical	  or	  some	  other	  familiar	  kind	  of	  indexical).	  (2)  If	  "knows	  that"	  is	  a	  standard	  indexical	  then	  competent	  users	  should	  be	  able	  to	  recognise	  this.	  	  (3)  Such	  users	   are	   in	   a	  position	   to	   recognise	   this	  only	   if	   they	  are	   able	   to	   articulate	  or	   clarify	   the	  proposition	  that	  gets	  expressed	  by	  “S	  knows	  that	  p”	  (in	  some	  context	  of	  use).	  (4)  But	   competent	   users	   are	   not	   typically	   able	   to	   articulate	   or	   clarify	   the	   proposition	   that	   gets	  expressed.	  (5)  So,	  "knows	  that"	  is	  not	  a	  standard	  kind	  of	  indexical.	  (6)  So,	  if	  "knows	  that"	  is	  an	  indexical,	  its	  indexicality	  is	  unprecedented.	  (7)  But	  such	  unprecedented	  indexicality	  is	  just	  ad	  hoc	  and	  thus	  “has	  no	  plausibility”.19	  	  In	  effect,	  Schiffer	  presumes	  that	  a	  speaker	  who	   is	  semantically	  competent	  with	  regard	  to	   the	  class	  of	  indexical	  expressions	  in	  question	  satisfies	  something	  like	  the	  following	  thesis:	  	  
Content	  Articulation	  Thesis:	  Semantic	  competence	  with	  regard	  to	  an	   indexical	  sentence	  S	  requires	   that	   speakers	   be	   able	   to	   specify	   what	   is	   said	   by	   S	   (in	   some	   context	   c)	   by	  articulating	  a	  natural	  language	  sentence	  that	  literally	  expresses	  the	  proposition	  originally	  asserted	  (in	  c).	  	  	  	  
11.	  	   An	  Initial	  Response	  to	  the	  Global	  Semantic	  Error	  Objection	  	  An	   initial	   response	   is	   that	   the	  Content	  Articulation	  Thesis	   is	   too	  demanding.	  Competent	   speakers	  do	  not	  generally	  have	  to	  be	  able	  to	  articulate	  semantic	  content	  when	  using	  context-­‐‑sensitive	  expressions.	  For	  instance,	  articulating	  the	  contextually	  determined	  modal	  base	  of	  a	  modal	  auxiliary	  like	  “might”—as	  is	   done,	   e.g.,	   by	   expressions	   like	   “in	   view	   of	   my/x’s	   current	   information”	   or	   “in	   view	   of	   orthodox	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Christian	   moral	   principles”—is	   not	   always	   something	   competent	   speakers	   can	   do.	   Similarly,	  articulating	  a	   token	  quantifier’s	   restricted	  domain	   (as	   in	   “in	   this	  apartment”,	   “among	   the	  students	   in	  this	  class”)	  can	  be	  difficult.	  Moreover,	  even	  a	  speaker	  who	  says	  “It’s	  raining”	  (Schiffer’s	  example)	  and	  responds	  to	  repeated	  requests	  regarding	  what	  she	  meant	  that	  what	  she	  meant	  is	  just	  that	  it	  is	  raining	  can	  count	  as	  a	   competent	   speaker.	   She	  may	  not	  be	  particularly	  attuned	   to	  differences	  between	  what	  she	  said	  (the	  words	  she	  used)	  and	  what	  meaning	  she	  expressed,	  and	  she	  may	  not	  be	  sensitive	  to	  the	  interpretive	  needs	  of	  her	  hearer,	  but	  this	  by	  itself	  does	  not	  show	  she	  is	  not	  competent.	  Examples	  like	  these	  are	  legion.	  	  	  	  
12.	  	   The	  Global	  Semantic	  Error	  Objection	  Strengthened	  	  Even	   if	   the	   Content	   Articulation	   Thesis	   is	   too	   strong,	   Schiffer’s	   objection	   can	   be	   modified	   thus:	   if	  “knows	  that”	  is	  context-­‐‑sensitive	  in	  the	  way	  gradable	  adjectives	  or	  “hidden	  indexicals”	  are	  (substitute	  a	  given	  Contextualist’s	  favorite	  model	  of	  context-­‐‑sensitivity),	  then	  how	  come	  speakers	  are	  much	  better	  at	  clarifying	  what	   they	  meant	  using	   gradable	   adjectives	   etc.	   than	   they	   are	  with	  knowledge	   ascriptions?	  How	  come	  they	  have	  prepositional	  phrases	  such	  as	  “in	  London”	  for	  the	  articulation	  of	  location	  or	  “for	  a	  basketball	  player”	  for	  the	  articulation	  of	  a	  comparison	  class	  to	  a	  use	  of	  “tall”	  more	  readily	  at	  hand	  than	  they	   have	   any	   phrases	   articulating	   epistemic	   standards?	   Note	   this	   challenge	   does	   not	   rely	   on	   the	  Content	  Articulation	  Thesis,	  merely	   on	   the	  difference	  between	   the	   ease	   of	   articulation	  with	   “knows”	  and	  paradigmatic	  examples	  of	   the	  Contextualist’s	   favorite	  model	  of	   context-­‐‑sensitive	  expressions	   (cf.	  Hawthorne	  2004,	  104-­‐‑5).	  	  	  	  
13.	  	   Responding	  to	  the	  Strengthened	  Global	  Semantic	  Error	  Objection	  	  Contextualists	  can	  meet	  this	  challenge	  in	  two	  ways.	  First,	  they	  can	  point	  to	  semantic	  or	  non-­‐‑semantic	  features	   that	   plausibly	   distinguish	   “knows	   that”	   and	   knowledge	   from	   the	   relevant	   context-­‐‑sensitive	  model	   expressions	   and	   their	   subject	  matters.	   Thus,	  Blome-­‐‑Tillmann	   (2014,	   section	  4.4)	   explains	   our	  lesser	  propensity	  to	  clarify	  knowledge	  ascriptions	  by	  the	  dependence	  of	  knowledge	  claims’	  felicity	  on	  the	   pragmatic	   presuppositions	   of	   the	   original	   context	   of	   utterance	   and	   the	   fact	   that	   a	   speaker’s	  clarification	  would	  involve	  conceding	  that	  the	  presuppositions	  that	  are	  needed	  to	  render	  her	  original	  knowledge	   ascription	   true	   were	   absent,	   thereby	   making	   clarification	   “pragmatically	   incoherent.”	   A	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parallel	  dependence	  on	  pragmatic	  presuppositions	  is	  not	  systematically	  present	  with	  uses	  of	  gradable	  adjectives.	  Cohen,	   relatedly,	   observes	   that,	   more	   generally,	   semantic	   ignorance	   with	   context-­‐‑sensitive	  expressions	   comes	   in	   degrees.	   (His	   response	   is	   not	   targeting	   content	   articulation	   in	   particular.)	   He	  explains	   our	   high	   degree	   of	   ignorance	  with	   respect	   to	   “knows”	   by	   pointing	   out	   that	   knowledge	   is	   a	  normative	   concept;	  possession	  of	   knowledge	   is	   valuable.	  Hence,	  Contextualism’s	   “good	  news”	   is	   that	  we	   can	   ascribe	   a	   lot	   of	   that	   valuable	   good	   (in	   everyday	   contexts).	   The	   “bad	   news”	   is	   that	   we	  nevertheless	   don’t	   always	   meet	   the	   highest	   epistemic	   standards.	   A	   similar	   “good	   news,	   bad	   news”	  Contextualist	   account	   holds	   for	   gradable	   adjectives	   like	   “flat.”	   The	   difference	   in	   semantic	   ignorance	  between	  “flat”	  and	  “knows”	  is	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  “we	  find	  [the	  bad	  news]	  much	  easier	  to	  accept	  in	  the	  case	  of	   flatness	  than	  knowledge,	  because	  ascriptions	  of	   flatness	  do	  not	  have	  the	  normative	  force	  that	  ascriptions	  of	  knowledge/justification	  do.”	  (Cohen	  2004,	  192f.;	  2005,	  61f.;	  cf.	  also	  Neta	  2003,	  407-­‐‑9)	  Second,	   Contextualists	   can	   also	   meet	   the	   articulation	   challenge	   by	   denying	   any	   relevant	  differences	  in	  articulatory	  ability.	  Thus,	  Schaffer	  &	  Szabo	  (2014),	   for	  instance,	  could	  respond—in	  line	  with	  their	  response	  to	  another	  strand	  of	  the	  semantic	  error	  objection—that	  speakers	  are	  not	  worse	  in	  articulating	   the	  content	  of	  knowledge	  ascriptions	   than	   they	  are	  with	  other	  relevant	  context-­‐‑sensitive	  expressions:	   A-­‐‑quantifiers	   such	   as	   the	   adverb	   “always”	   or	   modal	   auxiliaries	  might,	   can,	   must.	   The	  asymmetries	   only	   show	   that	   “knows”	   is	   not	   like	   gradable	   adjectives	   or	   “hidden	   indexicals”	   in	   its	  context-­‐‑sensitivity.	  	  This	   latter	  response	   is	  a	  special	   instance	  of	  a	  popular	  Contextualist	  strategy	  to	  argue	  that	   the	  attributed	  error	  is	  not	  ad	  hoc—pace	  step	  (7)	  in	  the	  Schiffer’s	  Global	  Semantic	  Error	  Objection	  (section	  10)—since	  similar	  error	  patterns	  can	  be	  found	  with	  the	  (particular	  Contextualist’s	  chosen)	  analogous	  class	   of	   context-­‐‑sensitive	   terms	   (whether	   or	   not	   the	   error	   is	   just	   as	   grave	   as	   with	   “knows”).	   For	  instance,	   Cohen	   (1999,	   77-­‐‑9)	   argues	   that	   while	   speakers	   are	   prone	   to	   ascribing	   flatness	   to	  paradigmatic	   tables,	   they	  may	   be	   led	   to	   deny	   that	   some	   paradigmatic	   table	   is	   flat	   in	   the	   context	   of	  setting	  up	  a	  sensitive	  scientific	  experiment,	  when	  microscopic	  bumps	  in	  the	  table’s	  surface	  are	  salient.	  Moreover,	  they	  take	  their	  denial	  to	  be	  in	  conflict	  with	  their	  previous	  lenient	  ascription	  of	  flatness	  to	  the	  same	  table.	  But	  since	  there	  is,	  just	  like	  for	  “knows”,	  strong	  evidence	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  context-­‐‑sensitivity	  of	   gradable	   adjectives	   like	   “tall”,	   it	   is	   plausible	   to	   assume	   that	   speakers	   are	   simply	   unaware	   of	   the	  context-­‐‑sensitivity	   of	   “tall”	   and	   thus	  mistakenly	  withdraw	   their	   flatness	   ascription	   in	   light	   of	   raised	  standards.	   Indexical	  Error	   is	   thus	  argued	   to	  be	  well-­‐‑attested	  with	  other	  kinds	  of	   expression	   that	   are	  context-­‐‑sensitive	   in	  ways	  similar	   to	  “knows”	  (cf.	  also	  Blome-­‐‑Tillmann	  2008;	  2014,	  section	  4.1;	  Cohen	  2004;	  2005,	  60f.;	  DeRose	  2006,	  327–31;	  2009,	  168–74).	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The	   force	   of	   this	   response	   depends	   on	   the	   independent	   evidence	   there	   is	   in	   favor	   of	   a	  Contextualist	   semantics	   of	   the	   model	   context-­‐‑sensitive	   expression	   (gradable	   adjectives,	   quantified	  noun	  phrases,	  adverbial	  quantifiers,	  modal	  auxiliaries,	  …)	  and	  also	  largely	  on	  intuitive	   judgments:	  Do	  the	  Contextualist’s	  particular	  model	   context-­‐‑sensitive	  expression	   in	   fact	  have	  use	  patterns	   relevantly	  similar	  to	  knowledge	  claims,	  or	  do	  their	  use	  patterns	  not	  require	  a	  Contextualist	  error	  attribution?	  To	  our	  knowledge,	  this	  question	  still	  awaits	  empirical	  testing.	  	  	  
14.	  	   The	  Self-­‐‑Undermining	  Objection	  	  Our	   discussion	   so	   far	   revolved	   around	   Schiffer’s	   original	   error	   case(s)	   against	   Contextualism,	   as	   it	  already	  prefigures	  most	  of	  the	  strands	  of	  error	  objections	  levelled	  against	  Contextualism.	  But	  there	  is	  a	  yet	   another	   dimension	   along	   which	   Indexical	   Error	   may	   be	   thought	   to	   be	   worrisome.	   MacFarlane	  (2005)	  gives	  expression	  to	  this	  worry	  when	  he	  claims	  that	  there	  is	  a	  general	  problem	  with	  attributing	  (semantic)	  error	  to	  competent	  speakers:	  	   [A]	  general	   problem	  with	  positing	   speaker	   error	   to	   explain	   away	   facts	   about	   use	   is	   that	  such	   explanations	   tend	   to	   undermine	   the	   evidential	   basis	   for	   the	   semantic	   theories	  [Contextualism,	  moderate	  and	  strict	  invariantism,	  subject-­‐‑sensitive	  invariantism]	  they	  are	  intended	  to	  support.	  All	  of	  these	  semantic	  theories	  are	  justified	  indirectly	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  facts	  about	   speakers’	  use	  of	   sentences,	   and	   the	  more	  error	  we	  attribute	   to	   speakers,	   the	  less	  we	  can	  conclude	  from	  these	  facts.20	  	  MacFarlane	   makes	   this	   dialectical	   point	   after	   having	   argued	   that	   all	   the	   mentioned	   theories	   face	  commitment	  to	  some	  error	  attribution	  or	  other.	  For	  instance,	  according	  to	  MacFarlane,	  Contextualists	  make	   the	   wrong	   predictions	   about	   speakers’	   cross-­‐‑contextual	   truth	   ascriptions	   to	   knowledge	  ascriptions	  and	  their	  willingness	  to	  retract.	  Thus,	  suppose	  Cem	  asserts	  “I	  know	  that	  my	  car	  is	  parked	  in	  the	  driveway”	  and	  is	  subsequently	  presented	  with	  error	  possibilities	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  car	  thieves	  are	  often	  nearby.	  This	   is	   likely	   to	   raise	   the	  epistemic	   standards,	   and	  Cem	   is	  now	   inclined	   to	   say	   that	  his	  assertion	  in	  the	  previous	  context	  was	  false.	  Moreover,	  MacFarlane	  claims,	  Cem	  will	  treat	  it	  as	  false:	   if	  challenged,	  he	  will	  retract	  his	  earlier	  knowledge	  claim,	  e.g.	  by	  saying	  “I	  was	  wrong.	  I	  take	  that	  back.	  I	  didn’t	  know	  my	  car	  is	  parked	  in	  the	  driveway”	  (cf.	  also	  Hawthorne	  2004,	  163;	  Williamson	  2005,	  220).	  There	  are	  two	  ways	  in	  which	  error	  attributions	  may	  be	  considered	  generally	  troublesome:	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(1)	  The	  “double-­‐‑edged	  sword”	  (MacFarlane	  2005,	  213-­‐‑216).	  A	  particular	  error	  that	  explains	  the	  use	   facts	   that	   are	   troubling	   one	   view	  may	   equally	   explain	   other	  use	   facts	   that	   are	   troubling	   another	  view.	  For	  instance,	  Contextualists’	  attribution	  of	  error	  to	  explain	  cross-­‐‑contextual	  truth	  ascriptions	  and	  retraction	  data	   runs	   the	   risk	  of	   equally	   explaining	   the	  data	   that	  Contextualists	  may	  use	   in	   their	   case	  against	  other	  views.	  If	  the	  involved	  error	  is	  one	  of	  projecting	  the	  relevant	  features	  of	  one’s	  own	  context	  of	  use	  onto	  other	  contexts	  of	  use,	  subject-­‐‑sensitive,	  or	  interest-­‐‑relative,	  invariantists	  (Hawthorne	  2004,	  Stanley	  2005,	  Fantl	  &	  McGrath	  2009)	  may	  use	  this	  sort	  of	  projection	  error	  to	  explain	  why	  speakers	  do	  not	  treat	  temporal	  and	  modal	  operators	  as	  shifting	  epistemic	  standards,	  e.g.,	  in	  “Before	  you	  mentioned	  car	  thieves’	  roaming	  the	  neighbourhood,	  I	  did	  know	  that	  my	  car	  is	  parked	  in	  the	  driveway”—use	  facts	  that	  are	  not	  predicted	  by	  subject-­‐‑sensitive	   invariantist	  semantics.	  Attributions	  of	  semantic	  error	  may	  end	  up	  levelling	  the	  dialectical	  playing	  field.	  (2)	   Overgeneration.	   Explaining	   a	   given	   set	   of	   data	   by	   attributing	   error	   risks	   overgeneration:	  other	  data	  that	  proponents	  of	  a	  view	  claim	  support	  their	  view	  may	  also	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  attributed	  error,	  thus	  undermining	  the	  evidential	  basis	  for	  the	  view.	  21	  	  	  
15.	  	   Responding	  to	  the	  Self-­‐‑Undermining	  Objection	  	  Self-­‐‑undermining	  objections	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  challenges	  to	  the	  semantic	  view	  rather	  than	  knock-­‐‑down	   objections.	   As	   it	   stands,	   many	   error	   attributions	   are	   mere	   diagnoses	   of	   the	   ways	   in	   which	  speakers	   diverge	   from	   the	   alleged	   ‘correct’	   use	   of	   “knows”.	   There	   are	   some	   attempts	   to	   meet	   this	  challenge	  by	  providing	  more	   specific	  psychological	   error	   theories—theories	   that	   explain	   the	  error	  by	  appeal	   to	   some	   general	   psychological	   phenomena	   rather	   than	  merely	   call	   some	  use	   facts	   erroneous.	  Both	   the	   dialectical	   double-­‐‑edged	   sword	   and	   the	   overgeneration	   problems	   can	   be	   defused	   for	   a	  particular	   semantics	   if	   a	   specific	   error	   theory	   can	   be	   shown	   to	   explain	   all	   and	   only	   those	   use	   facts	  which	  it	  is	  needed	  to	  explain.	  That	  is,	  it	  may	  be	  shown	  that	  the	  error	  theory	  doesn’t	  explain	  further	  use	  facts	  that	  allegedly	  support	  the	  semantics	  (defusing	  overgeneration	  worries),	  and	  that	  it	  cannot	  be	  co-­‐‑opted	  by	  rival	   semantic	   theories	   to	  explain	   their	  own	  troubling	  use	   facts	   (defusing	   the	  double-­‐‑edged	  sword	  worry).	  See	  §18.	  Our	  discussion	  so	  far	  focused	  on	  the	  varieties	  of	  error	  objections	  levelled	  against	  Contextualism	  and	   the	   responses	   available	   to	   Contextualists.	  We	   have	   not	   specifically	   addressed	   versions	   of	   these	  objections	  based	  on	  further	  kinds	  of	  data:	  cross-­‐‑contextual	  judgments	  about	  the	  truth/acceptability	  of	  knowledge	   ascriptions	   and	   retraction	   (e.g.	   Hawthorne	   2004,	   MacFarlane	   2005,	   Stanley	   2005,	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Williamson	   2005);	   agreement	   and	   disagreement	   (e.g.	   see	   also	   chapter	   20,	   “The	   Disagreement	  Challenge	   to	   Contextualism”).	   Contextualism,	   however,	   isn’t	   the	   only	   view	   suffering	   from	   error	  objections.	   A	   full	   appreciation	   of	   the	   force	   of	   Contextualism’s	   error	   objections	   requires	   taking	   into	  account	  the	  proliferation	  of	  error	  objections	  in	  the	  debate	  on	  knowledge	  ascriptions.	  In	  what	  follows,	  we	   illustrate	   two	   of	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   error	   objections	   multiply	   in	   the	   debate	   on	   knowledge	  ascriptions:	  as	  objections	  against	  relativism	  (§16)	  and	  against	  moderate	  invariantists	  who	  supplement	  their	  invariant	  semantics	  with	  a	  variable	  pragmatics	  (§17).	  	  	  	  
16.	  	   Generalizing	  the	  Challenge:	  Relativism’s	  Index	  Error	  	  A	   basic	   point	   in	   favor	   of	   Contextualism	   is	   the	   variability	   in	   speakers’	   acceptance,	   or	   rejection,	   of	  knowledge	   ascriptions	   depending	   on	   the	   context	   they	   are	   in.	   Classical	   invariantists	   have	   trouble	  accounting	   for	   this	   contextual	   variability.	   They,	   too,	   appear	   to	   be	   in	   need	   of	   error	   attributions	   to	  ordinary	   speakers	   (cf.	   §9.1)—or	   of	   some	   other	   way	   to	   account	   for	   contextual	   variability	   (cf.	   §17).	  MacFarlane	  (2005)	  extends	  this	  point	  to	  further	  views.	  The	  upshot	  in	  his	  paper	  is	  that	  while	  all	  major	  non-­‐‑relativist	   views	   are	   stuck	   with	   some	   problematic	   error	   attributions	   (or	   worse	   options),	   his	  assessment-­‐‑sensitive,	  relativist	  semantics	  of	  knowledge	  ascriptions	  is	  error	  attribution-­‐‑free	  and	  should	  be	  preferred	  on	  these	  grounds.	  In	   response,	   Montminy	   (2009)	   and	   Kindermann	   (2013)	   have	   argued	   that	   relativism	   about	  knowledge	   ascriptions	   faces	   its	   own	   semantic	   error	   objections.22	   Assessment-­‐‑sensitive	   relativism	  about	  knowledge	  ascription	  is,	  very	  roughly,	  the	  view	  that	  while	  a	  given	  instance	  of	  “S	  knows	  [doesn’t	  know]	   that	   p”	   expresses	   the	   same	   content	   across	   different	   contexts	   of	   use,	   this	   content	  may	   vary	   in	  truth	  value	  with	  the	  epistemic	  standards	  operative	  in	  different	  contexts	  of	  assessment.23	  Kindermann	  (2013)	  objects	  that	  relativism	  faces	  a	  version	  of	  Schiffer’s	  objection:	  A	  satisfactory	  relativist	  solution	  to	  the	  sceptical	  paradox	  must	  explain	  the	  appearance	  of	  paradox	  by	  appeal	  to	  an	  attribution	  of	  semantic	  error	  to	  assessors.	  However,	  the	  kind	  of	  error	  relativists	  need	  to	  ascribe	  differs	  from	  Indexical	  Error,	  which	  Contextualists	  must	  ascribe	  (see	  section	  6).24	  For	  relativists,	  however,	  “knows”	  does	  not	  induce	  the	  expression	  of	  different	  contents	  at	  different	  contexts	  of	  utterance.	  In	  contrast,	  a	  content	  expressed	  by	  a	  given	  knowledge	  sentence	  may	  be	  true	  at	  one	  assessor’s	  circumstances	  of	  evaluation	  –	  or	  “index”	  and	   false	   at	   another	   assessor’s	   index.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   kind	   of	   ignorance	   relativists	  must	   attribute	   to	  assessors	  is	  “Index	  Ignorance”:	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Index	  Ignorance:	  Speakers	  are	  ignorant	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  truth	  value	  of	  contents	  expressed	  by	  sentences	  of	  the	  form	  “S	  knows	  [doesn’t	  know]	  that	  p”	  can	  vary	  with	  the	  epistemic	  standards	  in	  the	  index.25	  	  But	  Index	  Ignorance,	  the	  objection	  concludes,	  is	  implausible.	  Speakers	  and	  assessors	  do	  not	  fall	  for	  the	  appearance	   of	   paradox	   with	   regard	   to	   other,	   standard,	   features	   of	   the	   index,	   or	   circumstances	   of	  evaluation,	  such	  as	  world	  and	  time.	  	  	  
17.	  	   Generalizing	  the	  Challenge:	  Error	  in	  Pragmatic	  Invariantist	  Accounts	  	  A	  popular	  strategy	  for	  classical	  invariantists	  is	  to	  explain	  the	  variability	  of	  acceptance	  and	  rejection	  of	  knowledge	  ascriptions	  that	  makes	  for	  the	  basic	  evidence	  in	  favor	  of	  Contextualism	  by	  appeal	  to	  general	  pragmatic	  mechanisms	  (see	  chapters	  16–18).	  Brown	  (2006)	  and	  Rysiew	  (2001,	  2007),	  among	  others,	  pursue	  this	  strategy	  for	  moderate	  invariantists	  who	  need	  to	  explain,	  among	  other	  things,	  why	  speakers	  in	  HIGH	  are	  prone	  to	  reject	  knowledge	  ascriptions	  and	  to	  accept	  knowledge	  denials.	  Put	  simply,	  these	  invariantists	   argue	   that	   an	   utterance	   of	   “S	   knows	   that	   p”	   in	   a	   context	   of	   utterance	   pragmatically	  implicates,	   rather	   than	   semantically	   expresses,	   that	   S	   is	   in	   a	   good	   enough	   position	   to	   meet	   the	  epistemic	   standards	   operative	   in	   the	   context.	   Hence,	   an	   utterance	   of	   “S	   knows	   that	   p”	   in	  HIGH	  may	  semantically	   express	   something	   true	   but	   pragmatically	   implicate	   a	   falsehood	   when	   S	   is	   in	   a	   good	  enough	   position	   to	   meet	   the	   invariant	   moderate	   epistemic	   standard	   but	   not	   the	   contextually	  determined	  high	  standard.26	  What	  is	  important	  to	  note	  is	  that	  this	  pragmatic	  strategy	  is	  designed	  to	  mimic	  the	  predictions	  of	  a	   Contextualist	   semantics.	   In	   consequence,	   the	   strategy	   is	   faced	   with	   (some	   of)	   the	   Contextualist’s	  recalcitrant	  data.	  As	  Kindermann	  (2016)	  argues,	  pragmatic	   invariantists	  cannot	  account	   for	  sceptical	  paradox	   or	   retraction	   data	   without	   attributing	   an	   implausible	   form	   of	   speaker	   error.27	   Therefore,	  appeals	   to	  pragmatic	  mechanisms	  are	  no	  alternative	   to	  error	  attributions;	   they	   incur	   their	  very	  own	  versions	  of	  error	  objections.	  	  §§16-­‐‑17	  served	  to	  illustrate	  by	  way	  of	  two	  examples	  that	  every	  extant	  view	  of	  the	  meaning	  and	  use	  of	  knowledge	  ascriptions	  is	  faced	  with	  the	  attribution	  of	  some	  error	  to	  speakers.	  If	  this	  is	  right,	  then	  the	  dialectical	  playing	  field	  is	  somewhat	  levelled.	  What	  is	  needed	  is,	  first,	  a	  more	  careful	  comparison	  of	  the	  kinds	  of	  attributed	  error	  and	  a	  thorough	  investigation	  of	  the	  criteria	  that	  render	  one	  error	  attribution	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plausible	  and	  another	  implausible;	  and	  second,	  a	  view’s	  error	  attributions	  need	  to	  be	  substantiated	  by	  plausible	   psychological	   accounts	   that	   explain	   why	   the	   error	   occurs	   systematically	   in	   just	   those	   use	  situations	   for	  which	   the	  view	  must	  attribute	   it.	  Some	  such	  accounts	  have	  been	  sketched	  on	  behalf	  of	  invariantist	  accounts.	  We	  will	  take	  a	  look	  at	  these	  before	  closing.	  	  	  
18.	  	   Psychological	  Error	  Theories	  	  Another	   popular	   invariantist	   strategy	   to	   explain	   (away)	   the	   intuitive,	   ‘erroneous’	   judgments	   not	  supported	   by	   their	   semantics	   appeals	   to	   some	   general	   cognitive	   mechanism,	   which	   interferes	   with	  semantic	  processing	   and	   for	  which	  we	  have	   independent	   empirical	   evidence.	  Hawthorne	   (2004),	   for	  instance,	  sketches	  a	  psychological	  error	  theory	  on	  behalf	  of	  subject-­‐‑sensitive	  invariantism.	  He	  appeals	  to	  a	  general-­‐‑purpose	  heuristic	  underlying	  many	  judgments	  under	  uncertainty:	  Psychological	  research	  on	  heuristics	  and	  biases	  shows	  that	  in	  our	  probability	  and	  frequency	  judgments	  we	  use	  a	  small	  number	  of	  heuristics	  that	  are	  cognitively	  effective,	  often	  lead	  to	  correct	  judgments	  but	  equally	  result	  in	  biases	  that	  may	  skew	  our	  judgments.	  One	  such	  heuristic	  is	  the	  psychological	   ‘availability’	  of	  relevant	  events:	  In	   assessing	   the	   probability	   or	   frequency	   of	   an	   event,	   we	   sometimes	   rely	   on	   the	   ease	   with	   which	  instances	   of	   the	   type	   can	   be	   brought	   to	   mind	   (cf.	   e.g.	   Tversky	   1973).	   Similarly,	   Speakers	   ascribing	  knowledge	   in	   HIGH,	   to	   whom	   certain	   error	   possibilities	   become	   salient,	   or	   ‘available,’	   tend	   to	  pessimistically	   overestimate	   the	   knowledge-­‐‑destroying	   danger	   of	   these	   error	   possibilities	   and	   as	   a	  result	   come	   to	   deny	   knowledge.	   Moreover,	   Hawthorne	   claims,	   they	   tend	   to	   project	   their	  overestimations	   of	   these	   error	   possibilities	   onto	   the	   subject’s	   position	   and	   come	   to	   also	   deny	  knowledge	  of	  the	  subject.	  Thus,	  reliance	  on	  the	  availability	  heuristic	  in	  assessing	  the	  epistemic	  danger	  of	  non-­‐‑knowledge-­‐‑destroying	  error	  possibilities	  may	  lead	  to	  erroneous	  judgments;	  attributors	  in	  HIGH	  are	  pessimistically	  biased.	  	  Others	   have	   developed	   similar	   psychological	   explanations	   to	   help	   moderate	   insensitive	  invariantism	   explain	   the	   data.	   Williamson	   (2005)	   also	   appeals	   to	   the	   availability	   heuristic.	   Nagel’s	  Nagel	  (2008,	  2010,	  2010a)	  account	  draws	  on	  the	  bias	  called	  ‘epistemic	  egocentrism’;	  and	  Gerken	  Nagel	  (2008,	  2010,	  2010a)	  develops	  his	  epistemic	   focal	  bias	  account	  within	   the	   framework	  of	  dual	  process	  theories.	  30	  Whatever	   the	   merits	   of	   these	   accounts,	   invariantists’	   attempts	   to	   integrate	   epistemological	  work	  on	  knowledge-­‐‑that	  with	  empirical	  results	  from	  cognitive	  science	  are	  clearly	  moving	  the	  debate	  in	  the	  right	  direction.	  Existing	  attributions	  of	  linguistic	  ignorance	  and	  error	  –	  such	  as	  Contextualists’	  error	  
18  
attributions—do	  not	   involve	   a	  psychological	   account	  of	   how	  and	  why	   speakers	  deviate	   from	  correct	  use.	  Invariantists’	  psychological	  error	  theories	  can	  claim	  to	  deliver	  just	  this	  kind	  of	  explanation.	  	   It	   is	   worth	   noting	   that	   it	   is	   open	   to	   Contextualists	   to	   co-­‐‑opt	   the	   psychological	   strategy	   and	  explain	  error	   in	   terms	  of	  more	  general	  cognitive	  mechanisms.	  These	  mechanisms	  may	   interfere	  with	  the	  proper	  execution	  of	   semantic	   competence	  under	  certain	  conditions,	   leading	   to	   systematic	  errors.	  On	   this	   strategy,	   then,	   Contextualists	   may	   argue	   that	   speakers’	   semantic	   competence	   with	   “knows”	  itself	  is	  flawless,	  but	  that	  it	  is	  skewed	  under	  certain	  conditions	  by	  general	  psychological	  processes	  that	  are	  not	  inherently	  semantic.	  	  	  	  
19.	  	   Conclusion	  	  	  The	  Semantic	  Error	  Problem	  for	  epistemic	  Contextualism	  comes	  in	  the	  form	  of	  different	  kinds	  of	  error	  objections,	   from	  observations	  about	  different	  facts	  about	  ordinary	  speakers’	  and	  philosophers’	  use	  of	  knowledge	   ascriptions.	   Contextualism’s	   need	   to	   attribute	   semantic	   error	   to	   speakers	   to	   account	   for	  some	  use	  data	   is	  seen	  by	  some	  opponents	  as	  constituting	  a	  decisive	  objection	  (e.g.	  Schiffer	  1996);	   to	  some	   proponents,	   it’s	   further	   evidence	   in	   favor	   of	   Contextualism	   (Schaffer	  &	   Szabo	   2014).	  Here,	  we	  haven’t	  taken	  a	  definite	  stance	  on	  the	  force	  of	  the	  Semantic	  Error	  Problem	  for	  Contextualism.	  Our	  main	  goal	   has	   been	   to	   chart	   the	   different	   versions	   of	   error	   objections	   and	   available	   responses	   for	  Contextualists	  and	  to	   introduce	  a	  number	  of	  useful	  distinctions	  between	  error	  attributions	  as	  well	  as	  different	  kinds	  of	  semantic	   ignorance	  and	  error.	  Our	  discussion	  should	  serve	  to	  highlight	   two	  under-­‐‑appreciated	  points.	  First,	   error	  objections	  are	  ubiquitous	   in	   the	  debate	  about	  knowledge	  ascriptions.	  None	   of	   the	  major	   extant	   views	   accounts	   for	   all	   the	   use	   facts	  without	   any	   special	   pleading.	   Second,	  error	  objections	   are	  best	  understood	  as	   challenges	   to	  Contextualism,	   and	  other	  views,	   to	  provide	  an	  error	   theory	   –	   a	   substantial	   psychological	   explanation	   of	   why	   speakers	   systematically,	   in	   particular	  kinds	  of	  situations,	  use	  knowledge	  ascriptions	  in	  ways	  that	  diverge	  from	  the	  semantics’	  predictions.	  So	  the	  force	  of	  error	  objections	  against	  Contextualism	  ultimately	  depends	  on	  whether	  Contextualism	  has	  a	  better	  explanation	  of	  the	  use	  data	  that	  is	  erroneous	  given	  a	  Contextualist	  semantics	  than	  other	  views’	  explanations	  of	  the	  use	  data	  that	  is	  erroneous	  given	  their	  semantics.	  	  Given	   the	   ubiquity	   of	   error	   objections,	   the	   debate	   does	   and	   will	   benefit	   greatly	   from	   two	  developments:	   First,	   a	  more	   systematic	   comparison	   and	   evaluation	   of	   different	   views’	   needed	   error	  attributions	   (as	   attempted,	   e.g.,	   in	   Kindermann	   2012).	   Second,	   the	   development	   of	   psychologically	  substantial	  error	  theories	  that	  explain	  some	  given	  error	  rather	  than	  merely	  describe	  it	  (cf.	  §18).	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case. Moreover, since semantic error is apt to be seen as a bad thing, the use of “semantic blindness” 
runs the risk of being an ableist metaphor.  
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8 Cf. MacFarlane 2005, 215. 
9 See Stine (1976), Cohen (1988), DeRose (1995), Lewis (1996). 
10 Here we outline what DeRose (1995) calls the “scepticism-friendly” version of Contextualism.  
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know that O but I don’t know that not-SH (DeRose 1995, §7). 
12 We take such a semantic story to subsume the meta-semantic story as to why the salience of error 
produces a high-standards context, and the non-salience of error produces a low-standards context. 
13 Cf. Schiffer (1996). 
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“knows” as an indexical verb which picks out different knowledge relations (e.g. knowsHIGH, knowsLOW) 
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the penumbra/extension of "knows that", like that of “flat”, can vary with the standards operative in 
the context of use (pp. 327-8). While Schiffer finds such variability plausible, he alleges that it will not 
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accommodate the kind of error theory needed.  
15 Here we adapt DeRose (2006, pp. 333-336) who instead uses judgments as to whether those who 
assert and those who deny Premise A (or indeed C) are genuinely disagreeing.  
16 Moderate invariantism is the view that “S knows that p” is not relevantly context-sensitive and that 
subjects are able to meet the epistemic conditions for knowing. 
17 See, for instance, the work on psychological error theories in Nagel (2008, 2010, 2010a), Gerken 
(2013), and a systematic comparison of the main contenders’ error ascriptions in Kindermann (2012). 
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devices of clarification seem available in the case of knowledge ascriptions. According to Hawthorne, 
the theorist’s locution “relative to high standards” is not a natural clarification device speakers have 
in their repertoire. (Though see Ludlow (2005) for a list of natural language expressions which are in 
use with knowledge ascriptions and may count as clarification devices.) MacFarlane (2005, section 2.3) 
puts the articulation/clarification point in the context of retraction: I will retract rather than 
reformulate / articulate my previous knowledge ascription in a way to show it consistent with my 
current claims. See also Feldman (2001, p. 74, pp. 78–9). 
20 MacFarlane (2014, 180-1) makes this point specifically against Contextualism. Cf. Conee 2005. 
21 A more specific self-undermining objection concerns a tension in Schiffer’s (1996, 326–7) local 
semantic error objection: With respect to the sceptical paradox, he claims that (i) a speaker interprets 
the proposition in the conclusion C as false and the proposition expressed by Premise A as true; and 
(ii) yet she is “totally ignorant of the sort of thing she’s saying” because she can’t articulate it. But note 
that in order to have strong intuitive judgments of truth and falsity, the speaker must have 
determinate if implicit views of what is said. If she was “totally ignorant” of which proposition the 
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chapters 22 ("Contextualism, Relativism, and the Problem of Disagreement”) and 23 (“Epistemological 
Implications of Relativism”). 
24 Cf. the notion of “Content-Blindness” in Kindermann (2013). 
25 Cf. Akerman and Greenough (2009) on the distinction between (Strong and Weak) Content 
Blindness and (Strong and Weak) Truth Blindness. 
26 Cf. Greenough (2011) who advocates Norm-Relativism—a form of Invariantism under which there is 
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